Collaboration, Co-prosperity, and
"Complete Independence"

Across the Pacific (1942), across Philippine Palimpsests

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Why is it so difficult to speak of the relationship [of the
Philippines and the United States] in terms such as invasion,
resistance (so readily applied to the Japanese in World War
II), war, combat, colonialism, exploitation, discrimination?
—Reynaldo C. Ileto

In posing this question in an essay about the Philippine-American
War (1899–1902), Ileto parenthetically references Japanese Occupa-
tion during World War II as an instance implicitly comparable to US
pacification of the archipelago at the turn of the century. One might
immediately recall the spectacle of Japanese atrocities to answer Ileto’s
question, but that would only reinforce Ileto’s point about the polit-
ics of historical memory, of friendship and forgetting. To think that
the occupation and pacification of the Philippines by the Americans
was somehow carried out without brutalities or imperial acts called
“terrorism,” as well as the counterinsurgent tactics such alleged acts
would inspire, is to have an inaccurate and perhaps wishful grasp of
what happened. In contrast to Japan, “Mother America is owed a life-
long inner debt, or utang na loob, by the Filipino people she nurtured,”
Ileto observes. From virtually the beginnings of US colonization of
the Philippines, the specter of Japan loomed as a possible successor
in the role of occupier. If Spain was the residual colonial master and
the triumphant United States’s regime was the dominant, then Japan
threatened to be the emergent force in the region to bring about a new
world order that did not sit well with American interests.
Historical events, especially from late 1941 to mid-1945, appear to bear out the validity of this American anxiety. But until those events actually happened, beginning with the attack on Manila in late 1941, the subsequent invasion in the early months of 1942, and the horrific years of war and occupation that followed, the meaning of Japan in US colonial discourse about the Philippines was contentious and speculative. This chapter centers on a prominent example from popular US culture (John Huston’s 1942 film Across the Pacific and its source material) as well as the discourse from hearings in the US Congress on the fate of the Philippines, c. 1919–39, to explore how US colonial discourse mobilized Japanese difference for coming to terms with the alignment of the Philippines and the United States during the colonial period.

Toward this objective, this chapter then considers the epistemology and tactics of collaboration and “amigo warfare,” a generative term Ito drew out from US counterinsurgency discourse during the Philippine-American War. In casting Japan as a threat to its mission in the Philippines, did the United States ironically end up making a compelling case for co-prosperity? Did US imperialism rely too heavily on the loyalty and gratitude of a population that may have had little reason to be faithful and thankful? The brutalities of World War II remobilized this triangulation. Prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War, such arguments risked being persuasive, even if—or probably because—they sometimes issued not only from the mouths of collaborators and spies, but also perhaps from pre-World War II US and Philippine political leaders attempting to codify and realize what was coming to be called “complete independence.” While this analysis is not a history, its methodology attempts to draw out historical implications through analysis of selected period discourse that may be particularly symptomatic of ideological conditions.

In this case, that discourse includes a 1941 short story serialized in The Saturday Evening Post, a 1942 Hollywood movie of that story starring Humphrey Bogart, and pertinent resonant moments from US congressional Hearings on the Philippines (c. 1919–39).

At issue then is the problem of loyalty for the project and implementation of empire—how loyalty is performed, read, and misread. Imperialism is premised on loyalty, and empires therefore ironically rely upon proliferations of surveillance. The ideal subject of colonialism is presumed to be the converted native, populations who genuflect not only in body but also in heart, mind, and soul. The colonized’s faith in the colonizer and the colonizer’s beliefs affirms the rectitude of the civilizing mission, and the colonized’s resistance to those beliefs also betray a fitness to be colonized in the first place. It is an irony of loyalty that it has historically demanded more rather than less surveillance.

In appreciating the palimpsestic predicament of the Philippines, this chapter considers the figure of the spy, someone who strategically navigates between layers of those palimpsests through persuasive performances of loyalty, or even disloyalty. The telos of history can be found where loyalties are rewarded or punished. The steadfast are history’s heroes, and the inconstant are vilified. For loyalty to be loyalty, it must operate independent of precise calculations of interest—including self-interest. Disregard for self-interest has been a hallmark of both the national hero and the terrorist. Consider the following from the 1902 testimony of the governor general of the Philippines William Howard Taft at a congressional hearing dealing with an insurgency that clearly resonates with the current War on Terror:

Gov. Taft: ... they are keeping them back from earning a living. They are keeping them back from their ordinary vocations. In the very province of Batangas itself the great majority desire peace and are only held there because of the system of terrorism of which I speak. Now, I say that warfare that depends upon terrorism and murder is a crime. That is all I have to say.

Sen. Patterson: Is it because in your opinion the independence of the Philippine Islands has become hopeless that those who are contending for it are guilty of a crime?

Gov. Taft: I think independence for the time has become hopeless.

Sen. Patterson: And therefore those who are fighting for it are guilty of a crime?

Gov. Taft: They are guilty of a crime in the method which they seek to attain it.9

The senatorial commission here gets Taft to articulate that his position is that fighting hopelessly for independence equals terrorism, equals a crime rather than war as such. By proceeding in violence with a lack of Taftian hope, the governor is in effect saying that these subjects are cast
outside of reason, beyond the pale of modernity, thereby ironically demon-
strating their fitness to be colonized or otherwise reconstructed after
a regime change. The already underway program of US efforts in the
archipelago then take on the character of upholding law against crime
and defending civilization against terrorism.

Imperial Anxiety, or How Do You Say “F**k you” in Tagalog?

"Late in June, candidates arrive from every state in the Union . . . Alaska . . . the
Philippines . . . the Army and National Guard—" So begins the 1927 silent
film West Point, starring the bankable William Haines and a charismatic
young Joan Crawford. This explanatory title appears early on to set up the
story of a brash young cadet (Haines) who eventually is transformed into a
model officer. This geographic listing maps the reach of the domain of West
Point and all it stands for; pedagogically, this title plots a before that will lead
to an after. The before is one of "candidates" from the far-flung reaches of
the nation and empire, while the presumed after of a West Point education
is a commission as a second lieutenant in the US armed forces, possibly
the Philippine Scouts branch of the US army, if that cadet hailed from the
archipelago.

Like many mechanisms of national and imperial culture, West Point
produces proper subjects, as does West Point. Managing the risk of rebel-
li
don is structured into power, bearing out what Michel Foucault referred
to as the "repressive hypothesis," and "pervasive implantation." that is,
that repression implies, identifies, and actually produces desire for resis-
tance. There is certainly ample historical evidence that not "every state
of the Union" or "the Philippines" has comfortably assented to compliance
in the past. In the peaceful and prosperous days of 1927, such compliance
may have come easier than in, say, the contentious times of 1861
or of 1899, but the fact of these histories of insurrection remains, even if
somewhat repressed and otherwise reconstructed. New temptations and
alliances may have emerged that test the capacity of the nation and the
empire to inspire consensual allegiance. These then are the conditions of
possibility for a military education in particular and of national/impe-
rial subject formation in general. And so the listing of "every state of the
Union . . . Alaska . . . the Philippines" may actually be useful for the em-
pire to remember when considering the raw materials of the ideological

work of officer training, especially if your local origins have been and
perhaps still are imbued with resistance even if your presence seems to
indicate perhaps the ultimate form of compliance through self-sacrifice.
In the case of 1899 and the onset of the Philippine-American War (or
Philippine Insurrection), the exacerbation of that uncertainty found a
name: "amigo warfare." In his generative work on "amigo warfare," Ileto
makes the following speculation:

Knowing more about the dynamics of amigo warfare, the ability to shift
identities in changing contexts, could enlighten us about the whole is-

sue of collaboration—collaboration not just during the war itself but
throughout the whole period of colonial rule. It might even explain why
Filipinos today seem to be so adept at handling tricky situations that de-
mand shifting or multiple identities and commitments. Collaboration is a complicated and uncomfortable aspect of empire but
historically it is indeed pervasive, a defining feature that makes an empire
an empire, a complex manifestation of the consent of the colonized.
Collaboration evidences a necessary malleability of the population to
make them fit for colonization through their loyalty being able to shift
to the (new) colonizer. Yet a malleable loyalty is not really loyalty at all.
And the result is a colonized subject who may perform compliance, even
in settings of extreme intimacy, while holding the potential for menace.
In a resonant observation about military outcomes, Clausewitz observed that

result in war is never absolute . . . The conquered State often sees in it
only a passing evil, which may be repaired in after times by means of po-

litical combinations. How much this must modify the degree of tension,
and the vigour of the efforts made, is evident in itself.

These "after times" are our times, where the formerly colonized and
conquered effect "repair," if not through "political combinations," then
perhaps through micropolitics and microaggressions. And so an acerbic
joke among US physicians inherits this history that goes something like
the following: How do you say "fuck you" in Tagalog? Answer: "Yes,
Doctor." The prospect of these tergiversations, whether of medical staff
or of amigo warriors, potentially links critical agency with a residue of a buried history of collaboration, where, in Illetó's observations, collaboration is emblematic rather than deviant when that history is disinterred.

"What does it mean to bury the past?" asks Illetó, as he engages in the task of unearthing forgotten and otherwise misunderstood histories of US-Philippine "friendship." More than two decades ago, Illetó had described this approach to recovered historical knowledge using the suggestive phrase "nonlinear emplotment" to challenge the then and still dominant project of "development," with the concomitant conceptions of Philippine national history that echo aspects of US colonial conceptions of that history. Illetó plots that linearity as follows:

Agoncillo's textbooks are considered exemplary in the nationalist tradition, but an examination of all modern history textbooks will reveal that they contain the following categories and chronological sequence: a Golden Age (pre-Hispanic society), the Fall (i.e., conquest by Spain in the sixteenth century), the Dark Age (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), Economic and Social Development (nineteenth century), the Rise of Nationalist Consciousness (post-1872), the Birth of the Nation (1898), and either Suppressed Nationalism or Democratic Tutelage (post-1901, the U.S. Regime).

To recognize nonlinear emplotment is to recognize incommensurable contradictions to this sequence, perhaps in the persistence of ideas and practices outside of modernization, as Illetó describes in his important history of nonsecular resistance, Pasyon and Revolution. To recognize the inheritance of these incommensurable contradictions to development is also to appreciate the dynamics of what Augusto Fauní Espíritu and Martin F. Manalansan IV have generatively termed "Philippine palimpsests."

The nonlinear, the palimpsestic, and even the contradictory can, I argue, be discerned at sites where contestation over divergent conceptions of destinies and development emerge. Collaborations then reveal the existence and stakes in Philippine palimpsests. Collaboration is a vexing notion to national development, especially when national development is understood as emerging from a colonized past. Such an emergence may be more paradigmatic than exceptional, as Benedict An- derson has implicitly contended. Such real or imagined collaborations are with any of a number of putatively outside agents, whether Chinese merchants, Christian missionaries, Muslim proselytizers, American liberators-colonizers-liberators, Japanese co-prosperers-cum-occupiers, or anyone else who does not have a connection to the "Golden Age" of the archipelago imagined in national consciousness and perhaps intimated by archaeological discoveries such as the Laguna Copperplate Inscription (c. 900 CE). The arrival at national independence then presumably means not only the end of empire but also the end of collaboration. That is, the realization of nationhood presumably means arrival at a condition where desire for alternative futures has been eliminated, and therefore making nearly unthinkable incorporation into entities such as Spain, the United States, Japan, the Soviet bloc, the Vatican, Al Qaeda, neoliberal globalization, or anything else that might register as counter to interests that have come to be called national.

Undercover Little Brown Brother

We'll lose our preferential privileges in the United States, and that will make some dislocations in our economy. But freedom can't be bought for nothing. As it is, we are now no more than a protectorate, a potential military stronghold in the Far East. The United States will probably never set us free, despite what they say. At the same time, we are not allowed to make any commitments with our greatest friend and nearest customer, Japan. We're between the devil and the deep blue sea.

—Prof. Barca, economist, University of the Philippines (c. June 1941)

It should be noted that Dr. Barca is fictional, but what he says may not be so far off from the actual official, and strategic, words of Filipino leaders of that time and the years leading up to independence. Dr. Barca is also the villain of Carson's story, but, like many a good villain, his compelling complexity may reveal more about the actual state of things than the well-remembered virtues of a lantern-jawed hero fighting for truth, justice, and the American way.
In the June of 1927 of West Point or the June of 1941 of "Aloha Means Goodbye," The Philippine Islands were formally a part of the United States and had been for about a quarter century. Yet, as early as 1919, the US Congress was already holding committee hearings on "Philippine Independence," in what would eventually become the Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934. Along the way to the granting of independence in 1946, the phrase "Philippine Independence" in 1919 and 1924 would give way in 1930 to the more precise phrasing "the withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the Philippine Islands and for the recognition of their independence, etc. [sic]." And by 1934 and 1939 the phrase "Complete Independence of the Philippine Islands" became the official way this idea was put into discourse. "Complete independence" was a phrase from the full title the 1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, the law that would putatively dissolve the formal bonds between the United States and its colony, The Philippines, over the next twelve years—"an act to provide for the complete independence of the Philippine Islands" and so on. The phrases "Philippine independence" and sometimes "United States withdrawal" had been used in official government announcements and titles in the decade or more leading up to the passage of the act. Even as late as 1932 the phrase from the Hawes-Cutting bill (S. 3377) was "a bill to enable the people of the Philippine Islands to adopt a constitution and form a government." By 1934, the concept of "complete independence" emerged as the operative phrase. Between 1934 and 1946, World War II of course intervened. Yet, the timetable ended up not being disrupted, ultimately then appearing to keep to twelve-year plan that the 1934 act set up for "complete independence."

National and imperial culture, as Benedict Anderson and others theorists have asserted, inspire the allegiance and the sacrifice of those interpellated by national culture, from print culture to war memorials. Such allegiance and sacrifice are at their zenith when nationalism and imperialism seek to integrate and conspicuously celebrate those who bear markers of difference that have legitimated the inequalities that made a nation/empire materially and ideologically possible. But what happens when that national and imperial culture fails to generate that allegiance and sacrifice and instead inspires forms of resistance? The simple answer might seem to be decolonization. History may have turned out differently, and what we see is a decolonization deferred. And that deferral, I want to suggest, is tied to the all-too-familiar loss of an economically inflected conception of decolonization. Not surprisingly, the entrance of the United States into World War II redrew political lines and economic interests. And the Cold War, as scholars like Jodi Kim and others have shown, only extended and dispersed these occlusions of the economic in the transition from the old to the new left. To grasp what this transition means it may be especially instructive to turn to those in the past who may have envisioned futures that did not come to pass. One such figure is the wartime collaborator, that intensely vilified bogeyperson who is perhaps the greatest anxiety for an empire fighting an imperial war, but who may also be a key asset of an anticolonial movement that, via conventional warfare, may be unable to effectively contend with its overwhelmingly powerful colonizer. Indeed this kind of strategic nonalignment is what largely defined the thirdness of the Third World throughout the Cold War. But in the pre-Cold War moment, the Philippines gets situated in an earlier manifestation of a third space, that between the United States and Japan—or fourth space, if the residue of Spain is recognized—at a fifth column, in any case.

The potential for alignments with presumed enemies has been a familiar and effective strategy for the colonized and otherwise oppressed and exploited. This strategy led Malcolm X to assert that he was "desperate to join the Japanese Army" or Muhammad Ali to famously refuse to fight the Viet Cong or Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to say to CBS News that it "is amazing that so few Negroes have turned to Communism in the light of their desperate plight. I think it is one of the amazing developments of the twentieth century. How loyal the Negro has remained to America in spite of his long night of oppression and discrimination."

For the Philippines context under US colonial administration, historian Al McCoy describes how after the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 in the Russo-Japanese War, the United States sought to cultivate an anti-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines. Accordingly, performances of possible alignment with Japan could then be strategic for destabilizing the dominant empire's rule by gesturing toward the dominant one, as well as perhaps abiding by the residual one.

To come to terms with this configuration, the main cultural texts this paper proceeds from are (1) from summer 1941, Robert Carson's "Aloha Means Goodbye," a serialized suspenseful short story about the
thwarting of a Japanese attempt to destroy Pearl Harbor with the help of collaborators, published in *The Saturday Evening Post* over five installments in June and July of 1941; (2) from late 1942, that story's adaptation as *Across the Pacific*, a 1942 film directed by John Huston and starring Humphrey Bogart; and (3) the pertinent official discourse of decolonization that Carson's and Huston's texts can be seen as a part of. The 1942 film, with its production and release that straddled attack on Pearl Harbor, changes the target from Pearl Harbor to another U.S. holding, namely, the Panama Canal. The film also changes the main collaborator to a Caucasian sociology professor, with a British accent and a Germanic name, on his way back to his job at the University of the Philippines; in the story, he is a Filipino economist on his way to Hawai'i to give a guest lecture at University of Hawai'i. The particular anxiety that the short story and the film manifest, and seek to manage, is, I argue, the anxiety concerning the alignment of Filipinos, especially the formally educated technocrats who would be—and historically have been—entrusted with shepherding a former colony into the emergent neoliberal globalization of the postcolonial, neocolonized world order.28 That post-Cold War world order we now live in is one in which free trade agreements are negotiated in a spirit of creating what can be thought of as a global co-prosperity sphere of trans-oceanic partnerships. It could be argued that collaborators Dr. Barca (in Carson) and Dr. Lorenz (in Huston) may, for better or for worse, speak to unrealized goals of redistributed wealth and power after colonialism, if not necessarily the means of obtaining and directing that redistributed wealth and power—to Japanese capitalists rather than US ones, and in any case, not necessarily to the masses, Filipino or otherwise.

In both the film and the serialized story, a key scene articulates the political alignments that are being tested in the build-up to the Pacific War that had been raging for almost a year in the real world, but not yet reaching in the world of the film. The scene from the post-Pearl Harbor film is as follows, *Across the Pacific* (dir. John Huston, 1942) (0:17:32—0:18:18):

Dr. Lorenz [Sidney Greenstreet]: I should enjoy listening to you two if you'll permit me.

Rick Leland [Humphrey Bogart]: You can referee.
Dr. Lorenz: Relationships between modern young Americans seem most peculiar to a man of my years. You give your lovemaking an assault-and-battery twist. Living so long in the Far East has perhaps given me a more or less Oriental view of things.
Alberta Marlow [Mary Astor]: We were discussing Philippine economics when we were so rudely interrupted.
Lorenz: My own field. Miss Marlow was kind enough to listen to me.
Rick: They're going to be free in 1946, aren't they?
Lorenz: They are, provided America doesn't insist on fighting a war with Japan. It's my opinion however that that contingency is going to keep the Filipinos from ever being free.
Alberta: Won't Japan gobble them up?
Rick: No offense but Japan or Canada or anybody else can have the Philippines as far as I'm concerned. It's hot in Manila.
Lorenz: It might be even hotter before long.
Alberta: Hot enough to go around in shorts? . . .

And now the scene from the serialized story published in *The Saturday Evening Post* in the summer of 1941:

"You were talking about Philippine economics before we were interrupted," Alberta reminded him.
"My own field," Doctor Barca said apologetically to Ricky. "Miss Marlow was kind enough to listen to me."
"You people are going to be free in 1946, aren't you?" Ricky said.
"I don't know. Are we?"
"Are you for it?"
"Definitely," Doctor Barca said, "providing America doesn't insist on fighting a war with Japan. But I'm afraid that contingency is going to keep us from ever being free. That and the stupidity and covetousness of some of our own people."
"Won't Japan gobble you up?"
"Why, if we're a good neighbor?"
"Aren't there a lot of economic problems involved?" Ricky said.
"We'll lose our preferential privileges in the United States, and that will make some dislocations in our economy. But freedom can't be bought.
for nothing. As it is, we are now no more than a protectorate, a potential military stronghold in the Far East. The United States will probably never set us free, despite what they say. At the same time, we are not allowed to make any commitments with our greatest friend and nearest customer, Japan. We’re between the devil and the deep blue sea.”

“Well,” Ricky said, “no offense, but Japan, yourselves or anybody else can have you as far as I’m concerned. It’s too hot in Manila.”

The stakes and the tone may be rather different between the two versions, especially given who is speaking: a Filipino in Carson’s story and a presumably European settler in Huston’s film. There may even be a sense of wily irony on the part of Dr. Barca emerging through an attempted Socratic method persuading Rick: “I don’t know. Are we?” and “Why, if we’re a good neighbor?” The latter rhetorical question probably being a nod to the Good Neighbor Policy the United States adopted for Latin America at that time. Also, he’s changed from an economist to a sociologist (albeit an economic one), with all that we may infer from that. If we do the math, we can estimate that Dr. Barca, as a senior faculty member around 1941 would have been educated in the 1930s at the latest, and certainly would have come of age under US colonization. He is precisely the sort presumed to be formed by colonialism and rose to be one of the elites. Of course, he is fictional, but one might reasonably presume that his feasibility as a character depends upon parallels to possible perceptions of a colonial elite who came through, and perhaps also taught at the University of the Philippines. 29

What Dr. Barca also gets to the heart of is the predicament of insularity that Downes v. Bidwell (1901) made US empire constitutional, particularly the notion of the post-1898 new possessions as “foreign to the United States in a domestic sense,” yet nevertheless under the plenary power of the United States. This idea arises in Barca (though not in Lorenz) as “not allowed to make any commitments with our greatest friend and nearest customer.”

To grasp the historical and discursive field of these scenes, we can trace the discursive moves — particularly the sense of irony and even humor of the testifiers — spanning twenty years US congressional hearings on the (complete) independence of the Philippines, discourse that resonates with the Huston film and the Carson story. We might almost...
Monday, February 11, 1924

[Hon.] Mr. [Manuel] Roxas [Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands]: The Japanese have known our country ever since the sixteenth century. However, never since that time have we had in our country more than 10,000 Japanese at one time. This is explained by the fact that the Japanese people do not exhibit a tendency to expand in the tropical zone. They cannot live or thrive in a tropical country.

The failure to colonize Formosa, which the Japanese Government has undertaken, exemplifies this truth . . .

Sen. William King (D-Utah): Then you have no apprehension, if you received your independence, of any invasion by the Japanese?

Mr. Roxas: Absolutely not . . .

Mr. Willis: You mean, of course, industrial invasion. Military invasion is another question, and we will come to that.

Sen. King: I take the position—and I think all those familiar with the island will take the same position—that there is no danger of industrial or military invasion . . .

Amidst familiar hypotheses about climatological fitness for settler colonialism is a telling distinction being made between “industrial invasion” and “military invasion,” with the latter being an overt assault on sovereignty, while the former is ambiguous.

Six years later, in 1930, Roxas returns to Washington to testify again, and he even more emphatically articulates harmonious Japan-Philippines relations and the myth of the “Japanese menace”:

Wednesday, January 15, 1930

[Hon.] Mr. [Manuel] Roxas [Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippine Islands]: This statement would not be complete without reference to the so-called Japanese menace to the independence of the Philippines which imperialists continue to harp upon to the great embarrassment of both the Government of the United States and Japan. The Filipinos, after a thorough consideration of that question, feel that no such fear of Japan need be entertained. Japan is a nation that is showing a real desire for peace and a desire to scrupulously maintain and respect the rights of other nations. Democracy is fast gaining in that country; this is the best guarantee against imperialism.

Two years later, the situating of Japan by advocates of complete Philippine independence makes that independence compelling, not despite but actually, in part, because of the Japan-Philippines-US relations.

Thursday, February 11, 1932

[Hon.] Clyde Tavenner [representing Philippine Civic Union]: The point is made that Japan is in favor of Philippine independence, so that she can go and take them. But I am convinced that Japan wants the United States to hold the Philippines, and to keep the flag flying there, so that if we get into trouble with Japan at any time, she can go over there and pull down the American flag, and make us send our fleet and our America boys there to fight her . . . I believe the day is come when Japan is going to say to you, “You taught us imperialism. Why is it worse for us to take Manchuria than it is for you to take the Philippines?”

These pronouncements might now read as a recipe for appeasement, given the events of history. Yet the logic may be persuasive, given the hypocrisies and contradictions of empire, as well as the isolationist and antiwar ideas Tavenner’s remarks articulate. (One might also hear resonance between the notion of “American boys” at the rise of fighting foreign wars in 1932 and “American boys” similarly mobilized thirty-eight years later, as articulated by Lyndon Johnson in his renunciation speech.)

Five years after the 1934 passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, attitudes toward Japan shift, as do military conditions. We hear again from Utah’s Senator King, who participated in the Hearings back in 1924 also.

Thursday, February 23, 1939

Sen. King: It does seem to me that one important matter, though, which might be stressed—and I think it has been stressed—grows out of the fact that conditions in the Orient are somewhat different now from what they were in 1933, 1934, and 1935.

Mr. [Salvador] Araneta [former member of the Philippine Constitutional Assembly]: Exactly.

Sen. King: At that time some of us believed—I among that number—that Japan was entering upon an era of democratic development. I was mistaken. Certainly I would not want to turn you over, turn the
Filipinos over to be devoured by Japan. I wouldn’t want, of course, to adopt any policy that might result in a conflict between the United States and Japan over the Philippines.35

So, what then does this mean for Dr. Barca and Dr. Lorenz? The answer may lie in the entrance of a curious figure in both the Carson story and the Huston film: a Filipino assassin who attempts to shoot these professors while the ship is docked (in NYC in the film and in Los Angeles in the story). The assassin fails to kill the professor; thwarted by Rick who uses that act to further perform to Barca/Lorenz that he is no friend to Philippine independence. The assassin is led away, presumably to be interrogated, tortured, and probably killed.

Given that the film was released in wartime, the assassin may come across as fairly unambiguous, as heroic and loyal to the US fight against Japan, a pawn, but a heroically sacrificed one. But given the complex process of decolonization that had begun well before the Philippines was colonized by the United States, this assassin may prove to be more difficult to reconcile neatly with the US cause. In neither the story nor the film does this character speak. One might want to ask this subaltern subject: On behalf of what future is he prepared to commit what can be understood as an act of war— an import-substitution economic future (in line with isolationist principles), or one of an export-oriented nature (in line with our current globalization)? Given that we see this assassin before Pearl Harbor, he might well have answered “complete independence,” with all the promise and ambiguity that that entails.

Notes
2. The end date of the Philippine-American War is debatable, with some accounts of hostilities stretching out for a decade. Even the ambiguous ending of John Sayles’s 2010 film Amigo may imply that the war, in various forms, persisted well after the overt pacification. Consider Amigo and Avatar. They are both movies about a recalcitrant population nevertheless attempting to cohabit with an alien occupying force. A sympathetic protagonist struggles to make sense of the questionable project he finds himself to be a part of, and he feels a connection with one of the natives as well as with the native’s way of life. Possible forms of collaboration ensue. In the marketing of John Sayles’s admirable 2010 film Amigo, parallels to the current War on Terror and the US occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan were presumed to be a selling point, especially perhaps for a presumed audience for an independent film. The film was not a box office success, which may perhaps point to its political and historical successes.
3. William Howard Taft explicitly uses the term “terrorism” in his 1904 testimony before a US congressional committee to describe the alleged conduct of the Filipino insurrectionists during the recently concluded war. See Henry Graff (ed.), American Imperialism and the Philippine Insurrection (Testimony of the Times: Selections From Congressional Hearings) (Boston: Little Brown, 1969), 96.
4. Ileto provides abundant evidence of the direct and indirect forms of violence that the occupation occasioned, from overt military actions to famines, disease, and agricultural devastation. This is, of course, not to say that Japanese occupation during World War II was not brutal also. On the pervasive brutality of the Pacific War, see John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon, 1986).
7. I borrow the dynamic of “Emergent, Dominant, and Residual” from Raymond Williams’s Marxism and Literature.
8. For example, see McCoy, 8; and Vicente Rafael, White Love, 36-39, particularly regarding the uses of census-taking in the early US period.
9. Quoted in Graff, 96.
13. Ileto, “Friendship and Forgetting,” in Francia/Shaw, 7. Sarita See has persuasively applied Ileto’s “amigo warfare” in her analyses of contemporary Filipino American
art and performance, particularly to appreciate the subversive cultural politics of comedians, such as Rex Navarrete.


15. Iteto, 19.


17. The differences between the first and second editions of *Imagined Communities* may be found in Anderson's work. Anticolonial nationalisms go from being the "last wave" in the first edition to being arguably exemplary for all nationalisms. He does after all prominently use Rizal's Noli as an opening example of how national consciousness is manifested textually.


19. The ending of the formal imperial era for the United States in the Philippines is usually set at the conclusion of the Pacific War, an involvement that is a direct result of the wars waged four decades earlier. Conceptions of decolonization that were uniquely occasioned by the conditions of World War II, particularly those conceptions of decolonization that became visible through period discourse concerning US possessions coveted, and in some cases occupied, by Japan, as was the case with Guam and the Northern Marianas. See Keith Camacho, *Cultures of Commemoration: The Politics of War, Memory, and History in the Mariana Islands* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2011).


22. This loss is not unrelated to that which labor historian Michael Denning traces in his lament for that era's left organizing with the onset of the global anti-fascist struggle, also known as World War II. Michael Denning, *The Cultural Front* (1993).

